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I. Introduction
Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”) is a process that uses in vitro fertilization
(“IVF”) to deselect embryos carrying genetic defects.2 One of the most controversial uses of
PGD technology is for human leukocyte antigen (“HLA”)-matching, an embryo screening
process that allows parents to choose the child with the best-matched genes.3 This child, known
as the “savior sibling,” is then used to aid a preexisting ailing sibling in need of a stem cell
transplant.4 Because PGD is a recent development in the medical field, its “savior siblings” legal
framework in the United States remains undeveloped.5 In the absence of guidelines regarding
PGD in the United States, providers and patients find support in two ethics committees while
making their decision: the American Society of Reproductive Medicine and the American
Medical Association.6 The former does not discuss using PGD for human HLA-matching, which
is how PGD is used to create savior siblings, while the latter states that PGD can be used to
“prevent, cure, or treat genetic diseases.”7 These ethics committees provide the backdrop for the
use of PGD to create savior siblings, but they do not explicitly address the issue of donations
from these minor children. The purpose of this article is to inform readers about the current legal
framework regarding minor sibling donations and to demonstrate how the methodology applied
by courts today is sufficient given the individualized nature of children presented in the limited
amount of case law on the topic of “savior siblings.”
II. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA)
Before exploring the cases discussing transplantation between minor donors, it is
necessary to explore the origins of PGD and the creation of savior siblings. In 1984, Congress
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passed the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) to outlaw the sale of organs for
compensation.8 The lack of monetary incentives to organ donors for their donations led to a less
effective organ procurement system in America.9 In the United States, over 95,000 Americans
waited for organs in the year 2006. 10 Fewer than 14,000 of those received donations. 11
Recognizing the average wait time to be somewhere between nine to ten years for procuring an
organ, parents became inclined to create their own supply system.12 The process of creating
one’s own organ procurement system is less expensive and more accessible than the national
organ procurement system, and legal scholars predict that the procedure will continue to become
less expensive and more accessible and the moral debate surrounding assistive reproductive
techniques will abate.13 They argue that currently, minor sibling donations cases represent only a
small population of cases in the United States court system, but if the predicted trend comes to
fruition, these cases will become extremely common and create a predicament for the courts.
The concerns expressed by legal scholars arise from an ethical, and even psychological
debate, but fail to address shortcomings in the way that cases of minor organ donations are
handled legally. In American legal history, conflicts regarding savior sibling donations have not
reached trial or appellate court level due to the unregulated use of PGD-technology in creating
these donors. If a disagreement were to arise between either the parents of the savior sibling or
the providers and patients of the procedure, the case would become a state issue, similar to how
other minor medical donations are addressed.14 The decisions made under certain states are factspecific, considering the best interest of both the parents and the children, along with the legal
competence of the donor child.
III. Current Legal Applications
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Cases of “savior siblings” specifically are of a limited nature thus far in the American
courts, and the legal discussion on the matter is generally analogized to past minor donation
cases. In the cases regarding minor donations, American courts have applied preexisting legal
standards: the substituted judgment doctrine and the best interest standard.15 In the case of
substituted judgment doctrine, parents are given permission to make a decision in lieu of their
children as though these minors were formally competent decision-makers.16 The best interest
standard requires the courts to use various tests in order to measure whether or not the
psychological benefits of the transplantation outweighs the physical risks associated with it for
the donor sibling.17 The two standards are used hand-in-hand by the court system, making them
hard to distinguish from one another.
In reality, the courts are using the best interest standard and the substituted judgment
standard interchangeably, indicating that although there are formal doctrinal distinctions between
the two, there is no practical distinction. For example, in Hart v. Brown, the Connecticut
Superior Court decided in favor of the transplant between two identical twins, as recommended
by their parents and guardians ad litem.18 Although the court attempted to use parental consent
as their reasoning for the ruling, their final decision was based on the fact that the donor sibling
would be “better off in a happy family than a distressed one.” 19 Similarly, in Little v. Little, the
court reasoned that a fourteen-year-old would benefit psychologically from donating a kidney.20
As established in the few cases in the American jurisprudence in which providers and
patients disagree about the transplant, the individual states tend to rule mostly in favor of the
donation.21 They justify the transplant by looking to the psychological benefits that it provides to
the donor. Although the courts have been met with little resistance in their application of the
best interest standard, more recent cases such as Curran v. Bosze demonstrate that family
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relationships have become harder to define, and thus, the psychological benefits for a sibling
have become more difficult to justify.22 Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Illinois attempted to
find support in the substituted judgment standard when deciding whether two twins could donate
to their half-brother. The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that parental consent was not enough
to justify the donation.23 Instead, the court sought to redefine the “best interest” of the twins in
order to fit the case at hand.24 Although, it might seem as though the American legal system
risks fitting the issue of minor sibling donations in the realm of preexisting standards, in reality,
many courts are implementing preexisting standards to fit contrasting cases of minor donation.25
A. Substituted Judgment Doctrine
In Hart v. Brown, the Connecticut Superior Court used the substituted judgment doctrine
to justify permitting the parents of twins, Kathleen and Margaret Hart, to undergo an isograft, a
one-egg twin graft, kidney transplant between the two minors.26 To support their ruling, the
court employed the conclusion reached in Strunk, in which the parents were allowed to make a
decision for their twenty-seven year-old mentally incompetent son to donate a kidney to his
brother suffering from a fatal kidney disease.27 However, critics of the substituted judgment
doctrine posit that the doctrine specifically allows substitution of judgment in determining how
the minor would decide if he or she were fully competent.28 In the case of the mentally
incompetent, assessing the decisional capacity of the incompetent seems acceptable, for they had
or should have once had legal competency; this is contrary to determining the intent of children,
who have never been legally competent.29
Alternatively, instead of focusing on intent like the court in Hart, the Supreme Court of
Illinois attempted to assess the patient’s personal value system in Curran to determine if three
and a half year old twins would decide to transplant their kidney.30 The court failed to find
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conclusive evidence on the twins’ “[m]orals, philosophy, religion, life goals, etc.,” and thus, they
concluded that the substituted judgment doctrine failed to provide evidence of the minors’
subjective intent regarding the donation. 31 Although Curran became the exemplary case
typifying how courts consider the substituted judgment doctrine in their analysis, most courts
ultimately look at some type of best interest standard as well. Trying to determine the personal
value system of a child is problematic, for individual cognitive and moral traits have yet to be
developed at this age, an area of further discussion later in this article. The best interest standard,
similar to the one started in Curran, is the proper analysis for courts to employ.
B. Best Interest Standard
When applying the best interest standard, the courts weigh the psychological benefits a
child will receive from a donation against physical risks associated with the procedure in order to
make a decision on behalf of the child.32 One scholar argues that even when courts claim they
are using substituted judgment, they are applying the best interest standard in deciding minor
donation cases.33 While the parents are deemed decision-makers under the substituted judgment
doctrine, courts make a decision for the child under the best interest standard. This is because
there is a conflict of interest present when parents make decisions for their children. Arguably,
they tend to place the needs of the sick child and their personal interest before that of the donor
sibling.34 Therefore, the courts interfere, explicitly recognizing that parental consent for minor
donations should never be enough in deciding transplantation and donation cases.35
The application of the best interest standard is exemplified in Curran.36 In Curran, the
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision to disallow the non-custodial
parent of twin siblings to test the two for bone marrow transplantation for their half-brother.37 To
reach this conclusion, the court established three ways to determine the best interest of the child:
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(1) the consenting parent must have knowledge of the risks and benefits of the procedure; (2) the
child must receive emotional support from the primary caregiver; and (3) there must be an
existent, close relationship between the donor and the recipient.38 The twins’ half-brother had
interacted with them merely twice since their birth, without the twins’ knowledge of their
relationship. Therefore the court found no existing relationship between the three.39 As a result,
the court ruled in favor of the custodial parent by disallowing the donation to occur.40 The court
clarified that the ruling was based on the best interest of the child because the three and a half
years old twins were not legally competent and did not yet possess personal value systems.41
Although the best interest standard appears to favor the donor sibling, one scholar
criticizes it for vagueness, arguing that in reality, there is no set standard for which factors should
be considered in determining the best interest of a child in minor donation cases.42 In addition,
the standard speculates too far into the future without considering the minor’s personal wishes
before the procedure. Children are unequipped to make medical decisions as the varying age and
personal development stages of each child are not individually considered. They are legally
marginalized, charging either their parents or the court system with reaching a decision on their
behalf. In the best interest analysis, the decision-making power is merely transferred from the
parents to the courts, and the issue of the child’s incompetence is never addressed.43
While scholars’ discomfort with the fluid standards of what constitutes a child’s best interest
is understandable, it is nevertheless unachievable to give children full decision-making powers
when it comes to donations. In cases of donations made by minors, a significant amount of
weight is placed on the child, regardless of whether or not he or she is the decision-maker.
Children conceived for the purpose of donations often begin to feel an obligation to donate to
their siblings whenever necessary.

For this reason, researchers assess the psychological
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development of children to decide whether they are capable of being responsible decisionmakers. Such research leads them to conclude that while children should be allowed to exercise
self-determination, they should not be burdened with the responsibility if they do not understand
the implications of their decision.44
C. Piagetian Theory
Jean Piaget, a psychologist best known for his theory on cognitive development, divided
children’s intellectual development into three stages: (1) the preoperational stage; (2) the
concrete operational stage; and (3) the formal operational stage.45 Table 1.1 describes the age
and type of cognitive skills children develop during each stage.
Table 1.1: Classic Piagetian Theory46

Stage
Preoperational

Age
Under 7

Concrete-operational

7-14

Formal operational

Above 14

Cognitive Skills
Magical thinking (cannot
determine the finality of
death)
Concrete facts and logical
cognitive operations (can
mostly
determine
the
finality of death)
Abstract thinking (can
determine the finality of
death)

D. Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development
Similar to Piaget’s theory of cognitive development, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg
developed a theory of moral reasoning that led him to divide children’s moral development into
three stages: (1) preconventional; (2) conventional; and (3) postconventional. 47 Table 1.2
describes the age and type of moral reasoning children develop during each stage.
Table 1.2: Kohlberg’s Moral Development48

Stage
Preconventional

Age
Under 7

Conventional

8-14

Cognitive Skills
Good and bad/ right and
wrong determined through
punishment and reward
Dedication to familial and

7

Postconventional

Above 14

societal expectations
Define moral values and
principles

E. Summary and Application
As demonstrated above, the cognitive and moral development of children engenders
confusion for legal decision makers. Arguably, children under the age of seven who engage in
magical thinking cannot fully understand the risks and benefits that transplantation entails.
Similarly, children at the postconventional stage might only think in terms of positive and
negative consequences of the transplants.

This makes it likely that a negative transplant

procedure can lead children to create a cause and effect relationship in which they blame
themselves for their sibling’s illness.49 Additionally, children at the initial stage of moral
development are vulnerable and easily influenced by their parents’ decisions. Considering their
decisions to be completely independent would be fallacious.50 This leads critics of minor
transplantation to conclude that children, especially in the initial stages of cognitive and moral
development, should be completely banned from participating in living donation procedures.51
Others, however, disagree with this argument, stressing the importance of the last stages
in both the Piagetian theory and Kohlberg’s model. From approximately the age of fourteen,
children begin to exhibit adult-like thinking. They become capable of thinking more abstractly
about “truth, morality, justice, and the nature of existence.”52 Lois Weithorn, famous for her
experiments with the Piagetian theory, concluded that when placed in complex scenarios,
adolescent children did not make decisions dramatically different than those of adults.53 Thus,
advocates of informed consent by minors promote legislative standards that deter coercion in
children by demanding consent and/or assent by the children themselves.54
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These psychological models should, nonetheless, be used for observational and
experimental purposes. Both sides of the issue on minor donations should recognize that the
models do not provide a clear-cut age limit as to when children have reached their full cognitive
and moral development. In reality, “other people, environment, and culture” largely influence a
child’s development and thus, the stages cannot be used to create rigid boundaries.55 The trouble
American courts are faced with is whether children are cognitively and morally developed
enough to make self-determinations or whether these models place a heavy burden upon children
who cannot understand the consequences of the transplantation procedure.56
IV. Conclusion
A child’s moral and cognitive development is not set in stone. Therefore, the legal
framework regarding donations by minors, especially “savior sibling,” is not flawed. Rather, the
implementation of a case-by-case analysis by the American judicial system is the most
reasonable approach in determining what is in the best interest of the donor, the recipient, and the
parents. While it seems ideal for the legislature to enact broad-sweeping regulation on the
subject, it is untenable to do so given the individualized nature of cases that come before the
courts. Best interest has always been contextual in family law, and savior sibling cases are no
different.
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